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Introduction
The challenges of nation-building in Melanesia 
and Timor-Leste have often been neglected in 
the focus on state-building agendas. High levels 
of ethno-linguistic diversity, combined with an 
array of regional, historical and cultural divisions, 
continue to present obstacles to the creation of a 
cohesive sense of national political community. 
One of the most profound obstacles, most agree, 
is the disjuncture between Westminster (or other 
European-derived) government systems and 
traditional collective societies, in which localised 
obligations to extended family and traditional 
authority frequently supersede allegiances to 
the nation-state. Perceptions of poor or even 
declining state effectiveness in this region have 
been reinforced by political crises and civil conflicts 
in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste, prompting 
discussion of ‘fragile states’ by formal agencies of 
regional powers such as Australia (e.g. AusAID 
2006). But while there is a wealth of literature on 
the sources of state failure, comparatively little 
is written on the views of this region’s citizens 
themselves: how they view the state, the nation and 
their own place within these entities.
This paper presents the findings of an 
18-month research project on the attitudes of 
tertiary students in Melanesia and Timor-Leste to 
national identity and key issues of nation-building.1 
The research was conducted at tertiary campuses 
across four sites: Dili, Port Vila, Honiara and Port 
Moresby. The study examined the attitudes of the 
young educated elite likely to dominate the next 
generation of leaders and decision makers. Their 
views are pivotal to understanding the challenges to 
building a more cohesive sense of national identity 
and political community in Melanesia and Timor-
Leste. Findings highlight the ongoing importance of 
family, religion and maintaining traditional customs 
in student conceptions of political community. 
Depending on the case study, they also illustrate 
the importance of geographical region of origin, 
language orientation, and gender in explaining 
differences in key attitudes towards national 
identity. This article presents a comparative analysis 
of those findings across the four target sites. 
In general, it is argued that the Melanesian 
countries show a relatively high degree of similarity 
in responses, with key differences attributable to 
particular historical, regional or linguistic legacies 
of colonial rule. A strong pan-Melanesian pattern 
of group identification was identified, common 
to Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu. The ongoing importance of traditional 
authority and custom in conceptions of political 
community and identity was evident in all four 
case study sites, but was in each case matched by 
indicators of respect for modern state authority. 
Most importantly, this study reveals high degrees of 
national pride, and faith in democratic principles 
and citizenship; conversely, however, it reveals 
low levels of pride in contemporary democratic 
performance and inter-group tolerance. While 
tertiary students demonstrate relatively strong 
attachments to the nation, and in-principle civic 
nationalist commitments to the state (including 
citizenship and respect for law and political 
institutions), concerns over the capacity of 
centralised authority to provide basic services 
appear to undermine positive perceptions of the 
state in practice. Counter-intuitively, pride in 
democracy and inter-group tolerance was higher in 
post-conflict societies (Solomon Islands and Timor-
Leste) than in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.
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Background: Nation- and State-Building 
Though the term has a long and diverse history 
(see e.g. Rae 2002; Berger 2006)2, nation-building 
is employed here to refer to the cultural processes 
of forming a cohesive political community to sup-
port the development of a functional state. While 
the international community is preoccupied with 
post-conflict state-building (focused on improv-
ing governance, institutional capacity, accountabil-
ity, and the rule of law) the broader processes of 
nation-building (community development, identity 
formation, and national integration), and of creat-
ing the conditions for social cohesion and political 
stability have been relatively neglected. Most inter-
national assistance undertaken under the auspices 
of ‘nation-building’ has in fact been directed at 
state-building (Chandler 2006), and the two cat-
egories are regularly conflated in the literature. Yet 
the challenges facing fragile or emerging states in 
the south-west Pacific derive from both a lack of 
a functional state and the absence of a functional 
‘national’ political community, based on a broadly 
legitimate and unifying sense of national identity. 
For Borgerhoff (2006, 103), nation-building 
is the ‘deliberate interest- and ideology-based 
formation of a national format which creates 
collective identity and affiliation of the population 
within the nation-state’. As Dinnen (2007, 3) 
argues, these conscious attempts to develop 
‘a shared sense of identity and community’ 
among various populations within a state do not 
necessarily have to foster homogeneity, but must 
at least produce a sustainable consensus on shared 
civic goals, and tolerance of heterogeneity. In the 
context of weak economic development, however, 
latent social divisions may be compounded in the 
competition for scarce resources, producing forms 
of national politics characterised by inter-group 
contests for the capture of the state, to benefit 
regional or clan-based patronage networks. Strong 
regional divisions in south-west Pacific states, 
with attendant problems of political stability in the 
region, attest to the ongoing challenges of nation-
building for postcolonial political elites. 
There are also particular challenges of 
nation- and state-building in ‘new subsistence 
states’ (Nixon 2006) characterised by low levels of 
economic development, and subsistence agriculture 
as a predominant mode of economic activity 
outside cities. As Nixon argues, where a substantial 
proportion of the national population is reliant 
on subsistence farming, integration into ‘modern’ 
economic and political systems regulated by the 
nation-state may be minimal. Such environments 
are normally characterised by the ongoing 
presence of ‘local administrative mechanisms 
capable of operating independently from the state 
in accordance with the principles of ‘traditional 
authority’ (Nixon 2006, 75), and the postcolonial 
‘imposition’ of a modern state model, rather than 
its independent development in situ. 
Effective nation formation is, therefore, not 
just about the lateral integration of different groups 
around ‘deliberate’ constructions of nation-building 
goals, interests and political values, but also about 
the way prevailing socioeconomic structures influ-
ence the formation or reproduction of political 
communities; how tensions between modern and 
traditional conceptions of authority influence pop-
ular conceptions of state legitimacy; how nation-
building and state-building agendas interact; and 
how these processes combine, successfully or oth-
erwise, to create ‘national’ constituencies in support 
of the state and its institutions. In particular, the 
sustainability of relationships between influential 
conceptions of traditional community and modern 
state institutions are central to the contemporary 
studies of nation-building (Dinnen 2007), along 
with the potential for ‘hybrid’ forms of political 
authority to promote stability (Brown 2007).
Nation-Building in Melanesia and Timor-Leste
Like most south-west Pacific societies, the 
four nations in this study (Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste) can 
be characterised as predominantly rural societies, 
with subsistence agriculture the dominant form of 
economic production outside urban areas. While 
geographic and historical factors have produced 
more ethnic fragmentation and variety in some 
countries (especially Papua New Guinea), all four 
countries could be described as segmentary societies 
characterised by multiple ethno-linguistic groups — 
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with over 1,000 distinct languages between them. 
While there is a history of cyclical and permanent 
rural–urban migration in each of these societies, 
land, language and clan are tightly bound together 
and constitute the most essential markers of 
social and cultural identity. Systems of exchange 
relationships within these family networks (better 
known as wantoks in Papua New Guinea and 
Solomon Islands) have primacy over obligations to 
more recent institutions such as the state.
The continued strength of traditional beliefs, 
languages and the primacy of family networks 
can be viewed in a positive light, demonstrating 
strong social capital (De Renzio 2000) within local 
groups. Nonetheless, these four nations face a 
range of contemporary problems, many of which 
stem from the imposition of a Westminster-style 
centralised state by outgoing colonial governments 
(or in the case of Timor-Leste, by Indonesia and 
then the UN) onto these highly heterogeneous 
and traditional polities, and consequent tensions 
between traditional and modern political systems. 
Aside from tensions between traditional and 
modern forms of governance, historical, colonial 
and missionary influences have produced a range 
of contemporary social and political cleavages 
which, in the immediate post-independent 
period at least, have been reflected in regional 
voting patterns, party preferences and also lines 
of conflict. In Timor-Leste, for example, the 
2006 conflict cleaved along east–west regional 
lines, driven by conflict within and between 
security forces, with the subsequent election 
resulting in strongly regionalised voting blocs, 
with the FRETILIN Party drawing its support 
predominantly from the east and the parties 
forming the new Parliamentary Majority Alliance 
government predominantly drawing their support 
from the western districts (Leach 2009). In 
Vanuatu, where the denomination of missionaries 
determined language of education, zones of 
Anglophone or Francophone missionary influence 
produced additional religious, geographic and 
political symmetries, for at least a decade after 
independence. While the symmetry between 
language of education and political party 
allegiances has become increasingly blurred in 
Vanuatu, this linguistic cleavage has continued to 
prove a salient influence on national identity. 
These same influences have also produced strong 
regional identities and often secessionist tendencies. 
In Papua New Guinea, the secessionist sentiment that 
emerged at independence resulted in a protracted 
and destabilising secessionist war in Bougainville and 
has endured in other regions such as in East New 
Britain (Hawksley 2006). Tensions have also mounted 
in West New Britain and Popondetta, Oro Province 
due to internal migration policies and conflict over 
land (Koczberski et al. 2004). In Solomon Islands, 
early missionary activity, combined with historical 
inter-island trading links, produced a strong Western 
Islands regional identity, and a movement which also 
threatened secession at independence (Bennett 2002). 
The legacy of colonial languages (a dual legacy in 
the case of Timor-Leste and Vanuatu) has also creat-
ed significant barriers to the development of national 
identity. The adoption of a single national indigenous 
language has had varying fortunes in each country, 
with Solomon Islands perhaps the last to accept Pijin 
as a lingua franca. Language policy has also been 
highly contested in these countries, most notably in 
Timor-Leste, where the adoption of Portuguese as an 
official language (alongside Tetun-Dili), in a country 
where the bulk of the population were educated in 
Indonesian, has been highly controversial. 
Christianity figures prominently in the daily 
lives of the citizens of these countries, with churches 
of various denominations playing a central role in 
service provision, especially in health and education, 
but also in conflict resolution and social cohesion. 
As with political systems, Christianity has become 
‘indigenised’ to some extent. In all four countries, 
Christianity coexists with traditional belief systems 
exemplified by Kastom (or Adat in Timor-Leste), 
with people able to maintain both belief systems in 
tandem, often with syncretic features. According 
to Douglas (2000), it has become a central motif in 
the rhetoric of Melanesian nation makers, who have 
sought to transcend diverse cultures and divisions 
by linking custom with Christianity as unifying, 
universal belief systems.
Rural–urban migration has also been a major 
feature of these four societies, and a considerable 
source of social tension. In colonial times, there 
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was tight control over in-migration to towns, 
which were largely reserved for the colonial and 
commercial elites (Koczberski et al. 2001, Ranck 
1977). This pattern changed dramatically with 
independence. According to Haberkorn (1992), 
Melanesia’s urban population tripled from a mere 
seven per cent of the region’s total population in 
1955 to 20 per cent by 1985, which he attributes 
to rural–urban migration. At current rates, he 
claims (2008) urban populations in Melanesia 
are set to double in the next 25 years. In Papua 
New Guinea, much of the recent urban migrant 
population has become concentrated in peri-urban 
fringe settlements, which have become a source 
of crime and sometimes social friction (Guthrie 
et al. 2005a, 2005b). In Timor-Leste, almost 
half of Dili’s population is composed of internal 
migrants, and most of this inward migration is 
recent (Neupert and Lopes 2006). Competition 
over land, employment and other scarce resources 
between migrant groups and original inhabitants, 
and resentment towards ‘newcomers’ has produced 
conflict in all four nations, most notably in Timor-
Leste during the 2006–07 conflict, and in the 
1998–2003 Solomon Islands conflict between 
Guadalcanal islanders and Malaitan immigrants, 
resident in large numbers in Honiara since the 
1950s. In Vanuatu, resentment of migrants from 
Tanna Island has also resulted in social tensions, 
which boiled over into conflict in 2007.
The societies of Melanesia and Timor-Leste 
are also characterised by a ‘youth bulge’,3 with large 
proportions of the national populations under 25 
years of age,4 and high fertility rates (compared to 
the rest of the Pacific), combined with low levels of 
youth employment in formal sectors. Tertiary stu-
dent therefore represent the most educated section 
of a highly significant demographic in these soci-
eties. These demographic features are associated 
with the increasing likelihood of civil conflict, and 
specifically in relation to large male youth popula-
tion combined with high levels of unemployment, 
increased rates of crimes and gang activity. 
Conflict has dogged the post-independence 
era for these countries, most recently in Timor-
Leste between 2006–07, Solomon Islands from 
1998–2003 and in 2006, and Vanuatu in 2007, but 
most enduringly in Papua New Guinea’s decade-
long Bougainville crisis. Ongoing but small-scale 
conflict still blights the Southern Highlands region 
of Papua New Guinea5 (Capie 2011) and some 
recently resettled urban areas of Dili in Timor-Leste, 
contested by distinct family and language groups 
(Scambary 2011). While Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu are currently enjoying a prolonged period 
of relative peace and stability, both have suffered 
recent violence and are still considered fragile states. 
The impact of these divisions on governance in 
these four countries has been salutary. Each country 
has suffered numerous crises of governance, 
with declining economic performance, levels 
of service delivery and a consequent decline in 
popular legitimacy. This decline in legitimacy has 
sometimes been reflected in voter turnout (Morgan 
2008). Apart from violent political crises, the post-
independence polities of these four nations have 
been subject to a progressive fragmentation, as 
political systems have increasingly come to reflect 
the traditional clan-based nature of these societies. 
This has produced unstable coalition governments 
based around personalities or blocs with regional 
power bases, often with few discernible policies 
other than competition for access to state resources. 
As Douglas (2000) argues, the state’s ineffective 
service provision and failure to equitably 
distribute state resources such as employment and 
development opportunities across all sectors of 
society, particularly rural regions, has revitalised 
traditional networks such as families and clans as 
alternative means of access to resources (see also 
Ketan 2004). The inability of the state to provide 
services outside urban areas has contributed 
strongly to a widening gap between perceptions 
of the state and nation in Melanesia and Timor-
Leste. The state’s declining reach and influence in 
regional areas has sharpened regional divisions 
and identities, thereby reinvigorating dormant 
secessionist tendencies. For this reason, Scott 
(2005) contends that the weakness of the state is 
a cause, rather than an effect, of the comparative 
weakness of national identity. As this study’s 
findings suggest, many of these historical and 
contemporary divisions remain key markers of 
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identity that give rise to often starkly contrasting 
attitudes to nation and national identity. 
Methodology
This paper utilises a unique dataset based on 
tertiary student survey responses. Surveys were 
conducted from June 2009 to March 2010 on 
the campuses of University of the South Pacific 
(USP) Honiara, the University of Papua New 
Guinea (UPNG) in Port Moresby, at three 
campuses in Dili (National University of Timor 
Lorosa’e UNTL, The University of Peace and Dili 
Institute of Technology) and in Port Vila (USP 
Vanuatu, Vanuatu Institute of Teacher Education) 
and the Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie. 
The survey tool uses some questions from the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
module on national identity (with permission), 
modified for use in local contexts, in combination 
with additional questions reflecting the local 
conditions, customs and geographies of these four 
nations. Surveys were conducted in the language of 
instruction of each campus: English at UPNG and 
USP Honiara; English and French in Vanuatu; and 
in Timor-Leste, in Bahasa Indonesia, the written 
language most easily understood. All respondents 
(n = 1,161) were tertiary students aged 18 years or 
older, and were surveyed anonymously. 
Questions fell into three broad categories: 
those addressing the respondents’ gender, age, 
province of origin and self-identified language 
proficiencies; the (modified) core questions from 
the ISSP examining attitudes towards the relative 
importance of particular indicators of national 
identity, strength of affiliations to different 
levels of political community, and national pride 
and group loyalty indicators; and third, a set 
of additional questions addressing preferences 
for agents of dispute resolution in differing 
circumstances. Among other things, these 
indicators allow the researcher to assess relative 
degrees of affiliation to traditional and modern 
political communities, and to local, sub-national 
or national communities. Survey responses were 
further analysed to examine any statistically 
significant associations with gender, region of 
origin or language proficiency. 
Before outlining findings, it must be emphasised 
that these survey groups cannot be considered 
representative of Melanesian and East Timorese 
‘youth’ attitudes per se. Rather, this particular 
study is a deliberate sample of tertiary students, 
which seeks to gauge the attitudes of an educated 
stratum of youth, and one likely to figure strongly 
in future political, economic and technocratic elites. 
Nonetheless, as tertiary institutions tend to be 
centralised in the capital cities, and students travel 
from all over the country to study, the samples are 
broadly representative of regions and districts within 
the case study countries. Importantly, where national 
sentiment tends to be most prominent in these four 
states, it is generally considered to be strongest in 
urban enclaves, which are typically more ethnically 
heterogeneous, and further removed from traditional 
communities and authorities in the regions. For this 
reason, tertiary students living and studying in the 
national capitals represent an important test case: 
they are more likely than the general population 
to represent an ‘advance guard’ of these ‘national’ 
identities and, equally, to exhibit a higher degree of 
integration into the political, economic, (and formal 
educational-linguistic) life of the nation-state. 
Survey Findings
Self-Identified Language Proficiencies
Figure 1 details the self-identified language 
proficiencies of the respondents in official 
or national languages. The survey responses 
unsurprisingly indicate stronger proficiency in the 
national lingua franca of the four countries (Tok 
Pisin, Solomons Pijin, Bislama and Tetum-Dili), 
compared with the European official languages 
(English, French and Portuguese). Notable among 
the findings were low levels of English language 
proficiency among Solomon Islander students, with 
rankings reflecting the interruption of schooling 
and of the education system during the crisis period, 
and the relative weakness of student proficiency in 
the recently reintroduced co-official language of 
Portuguese in Timor-Leste, where a key language of 
written literacy remains Indonesian. It is important 
to emphasise that these are subjective indicators, 
testing only respondents’ self-perceptions of fluency.
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Responses to Political Community Questions
A series of questions were asked to assess the 
relative depth of respondents’ affiliations to their 
various sub-national, national and supranational 
communities. Specific categories differed for 
each country to reflect distinct geographic and 
administrative communities such as settlements, 
villages, islands, districts, and also supranational 
regions such as Melanesia, the Pacific, or South-
East Asia. The survey asked respondents to 
identify how close or ‘emotionally attached’ they 
feel to each. 
Overall, each of the four samples indicated the 
relative strength of village and national affiliations 
for tertiary students, with considerably lower levels 
of affiliation reported for intervening sub-national 
categories (see Table 1). This finding reinforces 
the ongoing importance of kinship systems and 
interlinked land ownership in these societies as a 
primary marker of identity, and reflects the purely 
administrative value of intermediary entities, 
many of which, such as provinces and districts, are 
colonial inventions which resonate less profoundly 
with citizens. It also reflects the relative strength of 
national affiliations among tertiary students. 
In focus group discussions, students put the 
view that they had developed a stronger sense of the 
nation after moving away from their own regions 
and customs, living in the capital city, and mixing 
with peers from other areas of the country. Urban 
living, and the pan-ethnic cultures it created were 
considered a key reinforcer of national culture 
and sentiment. For the participants, the sharing 
of customs amongst students promoted a greater 
sense of national identity, where mixing with peers 
from one’s own village tended to strengthen local 
and sub-national affiliations. This presents a self-
perception of tertiary students as a group with more 
opportunities to develop a greater level of ‘national’ 
sentiment, and, accordingly, more capable of 
transcending local bonds and affiliations. Notably, 
the two countries with the stronger histories 
of anti-colonial nationalism and consciousness 
raising, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste, had the greater 
disparities between national and village affiliations, 
in favour of closeness to nation, while the strengths 
Figure 1: Self-Identified Official Language Proficiencies: Tertiary Students
Papua New Guinea                 Solomon Islands                          Vanuatu                          Timor-Leste
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of these twin affiliations were closely parallel in 
Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.
Supranational affiliations among tertiary 
students were, unsurprisingly, uniformly lower 
again than sub-national affiliations, Nonetheless, the 
relative strength of pan-Melanesian identifi-cation 
among Papua New Guinean, Solomon Islander 
and Ni-Vanuatu students was evident, with feelings 
of closeness to Melanesia significantly exceeding 
feelings of closeness toward ‘the Pacific’ region in 
general. For its part, the Timor-Leste survey clearly 
demonstrates the relative strength of South-East 
Asian affiliation (52 per cent) among East Timorese 
tertiary students relative to any affinity they feel 
to the Melanesian societies further east (20 per 
cent). This is an instructive finding that casts light 
on tertiary student perceptions of the view, more 
frequently expressed before independence, that 
Timor-Leste may be seen as a ‘crossroads’ society, 
linking South-East Asia with the Pacific-Melanesian 
region (e.g. Ramos-Horta 1996).
Regional, Linguistic and Gender Differences
Notably, however, when these responses are exam-
ined by region of origin, language of education, 
or gender, some distinct differences emerged. In 
Papua New Guinea, for example, region of origin 
was a strong predictor of reported levels of close-
ness to Papua New Guinea. In Papua New Guinea, 
there are four distinct regions (Papua, Momase, 
Highlands and the Islands), differentiated by their 
colonial histories, natural resource endowments 
and ethnic groups. Where an average 92.5 per cent 
of respondents from the three regions of Papua, 
Momase and the Highlands reported feeling ‘very 
close’ or ‘close’ to Papua New Guinea, this figure 
dropped substantially for respondents from the 
Islands region (80 per cent ‘very close’ or ‘close’).6 
As well as bearing out well known separatist trends 
in parts of the Islands region, this finding perhaps 
reaffirms Hawksley’s (2006) claim that acceptance 
of the nation-state in Papua New Guinea is heavily 
influenced by length of exposure to European rule, 
with the most fractious regions such as the Islands 
having the longest exposure, and the Highlands 
having the least.
In the Solomon Islands survey, Malaitan 
students were significantly more likely to express 
feelings of closeness to Solomon Islands (88 per 
cent ‘very close’ or ‘close’) than were non-Malaitan 
students (75.5 per cent). These findings suggest that 
Malaitan students living in the capital are relatively 
more likely to adopt a nationally oriented identity 
and perspective, while other groups are relatively 
more disposed to sub-national identifications. For 
example, non-Malaitan students expressed higher 
degrees of closeness to their home island (76.5 per 
cent) than did Malaitan students (70 per cent). 
These differences were much starker in relation to 
feeling ‘very close’ to their home island (50.5 per 
cent v. 33 per cent). These findings are likely to 
reflect varying feelings of ‘ownership’ or belonging 
of the separate levels of political community. 
In Vanuatu, Anglophone students reported 
feeling significantly closer to the Melanesian 
region (81 per cent) than did Francophone (59 per 
cent) students — a finding which likely reflects 
the dominance of English in Melanesian societies 
other than New Caledonia and, of course, the 
 
Country Village/ 
Neighbourhood
Sub-district/ 
Island
Province/ 
District
Nation Melanesia Pacific South-East 
Asia
Papua New Guinea 87.5 77.5 81.5 89.5 68.5 55.5 n.a.
Solomon Islands 81 73 71 82.5 66.5 51.5 n.a.
Vanuatu 84.5 83.5 78 91.5 73.5 66.5 n.a.
Timor-Leste 79.5 63 62.5 92.5 20 n.a. 52
Table 1: Level of Tertiary Students’ Affiliation with Community 
(percentage of respondents answering ‘very close’ or ‘close’) 
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historical origin of ideas of pan-Melanesian unity 
in the former British colonies (and Australian 
territories). It is likewise notable that where 
closeness to Melanesia exceeded closeness to 
the Pacific (71.5 per cent) among Anglophones, 
Francophone responses to the Pacific (55.5 per 
cent) were broadly similar, suggesting the relative 
weakness of any distinctive conception of pan-
Melanesian identity among French speakers. Even 
so, Ni-Vanuatu students as a group still showed the 
highest levels of affiliation to the Melanesian region 
of any case study country, indicating that the 
notion of a pan-Melanesian identity (and solidarity, 
of which several of Vanuatu’s post-independence 
leaders have been vocal champions, and hosts of 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group headquarters) has 
considerable resonance for Ni-Vanuatu students — 
and among Anglophones in particular. 
In the case of Papua New Guinea and Solomon 
Islands, gender was also a predictor of ‘closeness 
to village’, with 90 per cent of male respondents 
from Papua New Guinea feeling very close or 
close to their village, compared with 83 per 
cent for women. This disparity was somewhat 
starker again in Solomon Islands (men 84.5 per 
cent, women 72 per cent), and is likely to reflect 
young women’s attitudes to male domination of 
traditional authority structures, and women’s 
lack of voice in decision-making at village level7 
(Wallace 2000; Pollard 2000). One of the women 
in the Papua New Guinea focus group remarked 
that in her village women are forbidden to speak 
at public gatherings, which she felt was a situation 
experienced by women in many other parts of 
Papua New Guinea (Focus Group, Port Moresby 
2009). These findings were further reinforced 
in gendered preferences for agents of dispute 
resolution, discussed further below.
Attitudes Toward National Identity 
The survey then asked respondents about the 
importance of certain attributes to being a member 
of their respective national community. Respond-
ents rated their responses to these questions as 
‘very important’/‘fairly important’/ ‘not very 
important’/‘not at all important’. The national iden-
tity module consists of the following eight questions. 
The findings illustrate considerable parallels 
across the four countries, and a high degree of 
support for several of the indicators as measures of 
national belonging. However, significantly lower 
values were reported for the importance of ‘having 
lived in’ the home country all one’s life, and (with 
the notable exception of Tetum-Dili in Timor-
Leste) for the perceived importance of being able to 
speak official and national languages (see Figure 2). 
Three features of the data may be highlighted. 
In each of the four countries, findings revealed 
the comparable strength of importance of 
‘modern’ indicators — such as ‘respect for political 
institutions and law’, and ‘being a citizen’ — and 
more ‘traditional’ notions of political community, 
such as respect for kastom or adat. With the 
exception of Papua New Guinea (where ‘feeling 
Papua New Guinean’ received the highest rating) 
these three markers received the highest scores 
from tertiary student respondents, with a close 
parity between the perceived importance of 
these modern and traditional indicators in all 
four respondent groups (see Table 2). This is an 
instructive finding, revealing the way tertiary 
Some people say the following things are 
important for being truly [Papua New Guinean/ 
Solomon Islander/ Ni-Vanuatu/East Timorese]. 
Others say they are not important. How impor-
tant do you think each of the following is?
a. To have been born in _PNG/ SI/ VAN/TL 
b. To have __ PNG/ SI/ VAN/ TL __ 
citizenship 
c. To have lived in PNG/ SI/ VAN/ TL for  
most of one’s life
d. To be able to speak [official language a] 
e. To be able to speak [official language b] 
f.  To be a Christian
g. To respect tradition and custom/adat
h. To respect PNG/ SI/ VAN/ TL political 
institutions and laws 
i.  To feel Papua New Guinean/ Solomon 
Islander/ Ni-Vanuatu/East Timorese.
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student understandings of political community 
combine high levels of respect for traditional 
conceptions of authority with very strong support 
for modern ‘civic’ understandings of national 
identity. This theme highlighting the balance 
between modernity and custom is reinforced 
by students’ preferences for agents of dispute 
resolution, discussed below.
Secondly, the findings here confirm the 
importance of Christianity to national identity, 
variously reflecting the long history of missionary 
activity, the contribution of churches to fostering 
national sentiment,8 and their important role in 
service delivery. In such vital areas as health and 
education, churches provide between 30 per cent 
to 50 per cent of services in the four countries 
surveyed. 
Nonetheless, it is notable that with the 
exception of Solomon Islands, ‘respect for custom’ 
exceeded the importance of ‘being Christian’ as a 
‘very important’ measure of national identity by 
small but significant margins in each country. As 
one focus group participant said, while Christianity 
is important, it is popularly taken to reinforce 
traditional belief systems, rather than necessarily 
supplant them, ‘Christianity is like a string that is 
tying all that, you love your brother like you love 
yourself, just like the wantok system’. (Focus Group, 
Port Moresby 2009). The continuing strength 
of traditional beliefs and the primacy of kinship 
networks can be viewed in a positive light, as an 
important source of ‘resilience’ in times of crisis 
(Brown 2007), reinforced by the ongoing dominance 
of subsistence economies with a high degree of 
autonomy in rural areas. On the other hand, where 
diverse local cultures are unable to be incorporated 
within a national framework, in both ideological 
and political/administrative realms, the ongoing 
strength of kin and traditional loyalties militates 
against the development of national cohesion and 
development outcomes (e.g. Reilly and Phillpot 2002). 
Importance of Official Language Abilities 
The third feature of this data set relates to the 
perceived importance of ability to speak official 
languages (Figure 2). It is notable firstly that 
tertiary students rated the ability to speak official 
languages as comparatively less important indicators 
of membership of these national communities 
(though Tetum-Dili in Timor-Leste is a clear 
exception). This finding is likely to reflect the 
linguistic diversity of these societies, the historical 
imposition of the European languages, and, perhaps, 
residual perceptions of the Pidgin lingua francas 
of Melanesia as relatively low status languages. For 
 
Country To Be 
Born In
To Be A 
Citizen
To Have 
Lived In
To Be 
Christian
Respect 
Custom
Respect 
Law
To  
 Feel …
To Speak 
Official 
Language 
(National)
To Speak  
Official  
language 
(European)
Papua New 
Guinea
73 78.5 57 75 80 78 84.5 56.5 70.5
Solomon 
Islands
84 88 62 86 89 91.5 84 64.5 71
Vanuatu 80.5 88.5 59 79.5 83.5 81 80 54.5 60.5(En)
48.5(Fr)
Melanesia 
average
79 85 59.5 80 84 83.5 83 58.5 62.5
Timor-Leste 94.5 95.5 60.5 78 93.5 92.5 88.5 88.5 52
Table 2: Importance of National Identity Indicators to Tertiary Students  
(percentage answering ‘very important’)
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example, respondents in the three Melanesian 
countries rated ‘being able to speak English’ as of 
greater importance to national identity than being 
able to speak Tok Pisin, Solomons Pijin or Bislama, 
despite all cohorts reporting greater proficiency 
in the latter. This finding indicates the position of 
English as the status language of formal tertiary 
education, and may be particular to the specific 
group (tertiary students) surveyed in this study.
By contrast, in Timor-Leste, ability in the co-
official and national language of Tetum-Dili was 
considered be of very great importance to national 
identity, far outranking the perceived importance 
of Portuguese language ability. Even so, and despite 
the well-known controversy over Portuguese in 
Timor-Leste, and the evident disparity with Tetum-
Dili, the perceived importance of speaking Portu-
guese in Timor-Leste, (and to a lesser extent French 
in Vanuatu, and even English in Solomon Islands) 
rated considerably higher than actual rates of flu-
ency, indicating respect among non-fluent speak-
ers for the recognition of the language in official 
(constitutional) conceptions of national identity and, 
potentially, the importance of these languages in 
securing certain jobs in government administration.
With three official languages (including 
two European languages of education), Vanuatu 
presented a special case in this regard. While 54.5 
per cent of Ni-Vanuatu students rated the ability 
to speak Bislama as ‘very important’ to being 
‘truly’ Ni-Vanuatu, cross-tabulation by language 
of education revealed a considerable gap between 
Anglophone (60 per cent ‘very important’) and 
Francophone (42.3 per cent ‘very important’) 
assessments. Importantly, however, this did not 
reveal any particular Francophone indifference to 
Bislama. Rather, Francophones were less likely to 
regard any language orientation as an important 
feature of national identity, with quite consistent 
responses across all three official languages. This 
contrasted markedly with Anglophones, who 
broadly regarded official language ability as a more 
important feature of being Ni-Vanuatu. Indeed, this 
distinction was so pronounced that Anglophone 
Figure 2: Importance of Official Language Ability to Being ‘Truly ...’
7.5
90
56.5
4.5
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Very Important Important Not Very Important Not at all Important Don't Know
Papua New Guinean            Solomon Islander                  Ni-Vanuatu                       East Timorese
26.5
56.5
9.5
23.5
17
70.5
64.5 71
2125
54.5
60.5
48.5
24.5
21
29
88.5
8.5
32
52
8.5
29
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respondents rated ‘speaking French’ as slightly 
more important overall to ‘being truly Ni-Vanuatu’ 
than did Francophones themselves. This suggests 
that the politicisation of these issues has resulted 
in Francophones de-emphasising language issues 
generally in the vocabulary of national sentiment. 
By contrast, Anglophone respondents ranked 
capacity in each of the three languages more highly, 
with the greatest gap, unsurprisingly, in relation to 
the ability to speak English, which two-thirds of 
Anglophones ranked as being very important to 
being ‘truly Ni-Vanuatu’ — twenty per cent more 
than did Francophone respondents (45 per cent). 
Group Identity
Respondents were asked to rank the top three 
groups they identified most strongly with. Table 
3 rank orders the first preference responses, 
designated ‘most important’ by the respondents. It 
is notable that the rank order of all the responses 
to this question were exactly replicated in Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, 
suggesting a strongly consistent pan-Melanesian 
pattern of identification. The table demonstrates 
the importance, in order, of family, religion and then 
occupation to tertiary students in each of these three 
countries. Timor-Leste showed a variant pattern, 
with occupation the key identity marker, followed 
by the family and then religion. Interestingly, 
‘ethnic/language group’ ranked closely parallel to 
‘nationalist’ in the four countries, while Timor-
Leste received the only notable response for ‘region 
of the country you live in’: a finding likely to be a 
remnant of the politicisation of regional identity 
in the political-military crisis of 2006. In Vanuatu, 
significant differences were again evident between 
Anglophone and Francophone respondents, with the 
latter showing a distinct ranked preference of Family 
(36 per cent), Occupation (17 per cent), followed by 
Ethnic/language group (16 per cent). The relatively 
higher ranking of ethnic/language group among 
Francophones is an instructive finding, and one 
likely to reflect the greater consciousness of language 
group identity, characteristic of many national 
minorities. Interestingly, the category of ‘nationalist’ 
performed more strongly among Francophones (12.5 
per cent), while religion was ranked much lower 
than for Anglophones, in fifth place (11.5 per cent). 
Table 3: Importance to Tertiary Students of Identifying with Particular Groups 
(ranked percentage of first preferences)
Group Papua New 
Guinea 
Solomon  
Islands 
Vanuatu Timor-Leste
Family 57.0 33.3 44.7 22.5
Religion 18.1 19.9 23.5 11.6
Occupation 11.6 14.0 13.7 36.7
Ethnic/language group 5.1 11.3 6.8 7.8
Nationalist 3.8 10.8 6.5 9.5
Gender 2.1 5.9 2.4 4.0
Region of the country 
you live in
1.0 3.2 1.4 6.4
Age 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.9
Preferred Political Party 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.6
Actual survey question: ‘We are all part of different groups, but some are more important than others 
to us. Which do you rate as the most important?’
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National Pride Indicators
A further set of survey questions asked respondents 
about their level of national pride in relation to 
various aspects of each country’s politics, history 
and culture. Responses are detailed in Table 4. In 
each case study country, the two categories which 
drew the more equivocal responses were pride in 
‘the way democracy works’, and pride in ‘the fair 
and equal treatment of all groups in society’. By 
contrast, pride in national history, and pride in the 
nation’s distinctive culture featured very strongly 
across the four cohorts. This indicates that the key 
strengths of contemporary Melanesian and East 
Timorese nationalism lie less in the capacity of 
the state, and more in wider popular affiliations to 
society, culture, and independence. Certainly, the 
findings support the focus of Melanesian nation-
builders on national culture as a unifying theme of 
post-independence nationalism, and help explain 
the emphasis of political elites on related concepts 
such as the ‘Papua New Guinean way’ or the 
‘Melanesian way’.
Nonetheless, while the findings at Table 2 
above showed high levels of respect for political 
institutions and the law in principle, these 
figures demonstrate a relative lack of faith in 
contemporary democratic performance in practice, 
and in the formal state’s capacity to ensure the 
equal treatment of all groups, in all four countries. 
This was most notable in Papua New Guinea. 
Strikingly, just half of the respondents were ‘very 
proud’ or ‘proud’ of ‘the way democracy works’, 
with even fewer reporting pride in Papua New 
Guinea’s ‘fair and equal treatment of all groups in 
society’. This stands in contrast to Timor-Leste 
(with 79.5 per cent ‘very proud’ or ‘proud’), which 
experienced a major civil conflict and political 
crisis in 2006, and even Solomon Islands at 68 
per cent, which also suffered a major civil conflict 
and — in Honiara at least — an almost complete 
breakdown of law and order from 1999–2003, and 
major urban riots in 2006. While it is tempting 
to speculate as to whether the international 
and regional state-building missions in Timor-
Leste and Solomon Islands have contributed 
to a relatively greater sense of pride in ‘the way 
democracy works’ in these two countries, previous 
studies in Timor-Leste (Leach 2003, 2008) suggest 
that this particular figure merely represents 
a recovery to the levels enjoyed shortly after 
Table 4: Tertiary Students’ Levels of National Pride (percentage of respondents)
 
Very 
proud
Total 
Proud
Very 
proud
Total 
Proud
Very 
proud
Total 
Proud
Very 
proud
Total 
Proud
The way demo-
cracy works
22.5 51 39 68 30.5 63 45.5 79.5
Its distinctive 
culture 
82.0 95.5 70.5 90.5 63.5 91.5 67 96
Its history 61.5 92.5 73.5 93.5 69.0 92.5 80 97.5
Fair and equal 
treatment of all 
groups in society
21 44 43 72.5 40.5 70.5 48.5 76.5
  PNG                         Solomon Islands                         Vanuatu                       Timor-Leste
Note: Actual survey question =‘How proud are you of PNG/ Solomon Islands/ Vanuatu/ Timor-Leste in each of the following?
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independence in 2002 (‘very proud’ 51 per cent, 
total 79 per cent), which had dropped significantly 
in his 2007 study (‘very proud’ 36 per cent, total 69 
per cent) following the 2006 crisis. 
Regional, linguistic and gender breakdowns 
produced some notable findings, indicative of the 
history of uneven resource distribution and service 
delivery in these four countries, along with ongoing 
ethno-linguistic schisms, and civil conflict. In Papua 
New Guinea, respondents from the Papua region 
were far less proud of ‘the way democracy works’ at 
34 per cent, compared to an average of around 55 
per cent for the other three regions. This interesting 
finding suggests that popular disaffection with mod-
ern democracy in Papua New Guinea is most evi-
dent in the region dominated by key institutions of 
the state, and capital city. This may itself be a reflec-
tion of the numerical domination of parliament by 
the more highly populated Highlands region.
In Vanuatu, Francophone respondents (60 per 
cent) reported significantly lower levels of pride 
in Vanuatu’s ‘fair and equal treatment of all groups 
in society’ than did Anglophone students (76 per 
cent), perhaps indicating a degree of discontent 
over perceived advantages enjoyed by Anglophone 
speakers in the education and employment sectors. 
As Van Trease (1987) notes, the relative lack of 
tertiary opportunities for Francophones within 
Vanuatu is in large part an institutional legacy of 
French colonial educational policies, rather than 
simply being a product of post-independence 
policy decisions. Nonetheless, it is likely at this 
point that Francophones feel some resentment 
at the lack of comparable tertiary education 
opportunities inside Vanuatu.
In Solomon Islands, some significant regional 
differences in the responses to national pride 
questions were evident. For example, students from 
Malaita were more likely to feel ‘very proud’ of 
democracy than the rest of the respondent group 
(45 per cent v. 31 per cent), and of the ‘fair and 
equal treatment of all groups in society’ (50 per cent 
v. 36 per cent),9 findings that are likely to reflect 
perceptions that Malaitans enjoy a higher level of 
representation of in government and bureaucracy.
There was also a significant gender disparity 
in responses to national pride questions in some 
countries. In Papua New Guinea, for example, 
female students were significantly less proud of 
Papua New Guinea’s ‘fair and equal treatment of 
Figure 3: Tertiary Students’ Pride in the Way Democracy Works
Papua New 
Guinea 
Vanuatu Solomon 
Islands
Timor-Leste
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Don't Know
Not at All
Not Very Proud
Proud
Very Proud
22.4
30.3
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45.5
’t ow
 t Al
 ery Proud
ry Proud
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all groups in society’ (39 per cent), relative to 
male respondents (47 per cent). This is perhaps 
unsurprising, considering the subordinate role of 
women in Papua New Guinea society and politics, 
in both traditional and modern realms. Apart from 
alarmingly high levels of gender-based violence, 
women also face discrimination at nearly all levels 
of political and social life (AusAID 2008).10
Maintenance of Cultural Identities
Another aspect of understanding national identity 
lies in the profound and continuing importance 
of local cultures. As demonstrated in Table 5, 
while culture was found to be a key object of 
national pride in all four countries, the very idea 
of culture nonetheless remains firmly associated 
with local, rather than national communities, with 
a majority of respondents in each country (albeit 
with a significantly smaller one in Timor-Leste) 
agreeing with the statement that it is better if 
groups ‘maintain their distinct languages, customs 
and traditions’, rather than ‘adapt and blend into 
one society’. Reflecting a view widely noted in the 
qualitative literature, particularly in relation to 
Papua New Guinea, the findings suggest the theme 
of culture is a popular one for leaders, but mixed in 
its impact, with a tendency to reinforce the integrity 
of local cultures rather than necessarily promote 
a nation-building agenda. While this pattern 
does not preclude a ‘unity in diversity’ model of 
cultural nationalism, the failure to incorporate 
highly resilient local political communities at the 
level of formal governance structures may lead to 
other dysfunctions in nation-building. As Jacobsen 
argues (1997, 242), cultural ‘pluralism without 
representation’ may lead to communities becoming 
‘elusive, inward looking and disaffected’, or to the 
creation of a range of informal ‘institutional hybrids’ 
which may undermine nation-building.
Rural–Urban Migration 
Respondents were also asked two questions related 
to the key issue of rural–urban migration: whether 
‘people moving to the cities and towns causes 
social problems’, and whether ‘people should stay 
in the area of the country where they grew up’. As 
is evident in Table 6, these questions drew strong 
responses indicating a depth of feeling around the 
issue of rural/urban migration.
Papua New Guinea drew the strongest response 
to the first question, with a startling figure of 92 
per cent of student respondents agreeing with 
the statement that ‘people moving to cities and 
towns causes social problems’. The population of 
peri-urban settlements has progressively grown 
from some 25 per cent of the population of Port 
Moresby in 1979 to nearly half by 2001 (Koczberski 
et al. 2001), with a subsequent unofficial estimate 
placing the figure as high as two-thirds (Squires 
2004). Migrant squatter settlements in the major 
towns are commonly seen as a major source of 
crime, although some authors (e.g. Goddard 2005) 
challenge the validity of this claim. Certainly, a 
number of these settlements in Port Moresby are 
regarded as ‘no go’ areas for the public and even 
the police. Accurately or otherwise, many locals 
View Papua New 
Guinea
Solomon 
Islands
Vanuatu Timor-Leste
It is better if groups maintain their 
distinct languages, customs and traditions
71.5 82.8 86.0 62.4
It is better if these groups adapt and  
blend into one society
28.5 17.2 14.0 37.6
Table 5: Tertiary Students’ Views on Cultural Pluralism  
(percentage of respondents)
Note: Actual survey question = Some people say that it is better for a nation if different ethnic groups 
maintain their distinct languages, customs and traditions. Others say it is better if these groups adapt 
and blend into one society. Which of these views is closest to your own? 
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blame the migrants from predominantly Highland 
areas for the growth in crime rates, especially the 
rise of raskol groups. Despite this finding, support 
for the statement that ‘people should stay in the 
area in which they grew up’, was far weaker among 
Papua New Guinea tertiary students (56.5 per cent), 
suggesting that while respondents may view these as 
serious problems, they regard freedom of movement 
as a prevailing liberty for citizens, particularly in 
their search for employment or education.
In Solomon Islands, reflecting the recent and 
prolonged history of conflict in Honiara, some 
88 per cent of respondents ‘strongly agreed’ (48.5 
per cent) or ‘agreed’ (39.5 per cent) that ‘people 
moving to the cities causes social problems’; a 
finding which likely reflects perceptions within 
Honiara specifically of increased overcrowding, 
growing numbers of disenfranchised young 
people and increased unemployment and crime 
rates. Indeed, the disaggregated response rate for 
Guadalcanal students alone was 96 per cent, the 
highest of any province. By contrast, support for the 
statement, ‘people should stay in the area in which 
they grew up’ was again weaker at 68 per cent, 
again suggesting that fewer consider it acceptable 
to restrict freedom of movement for Solomon 
Islanders. This figure was nonetheless the highest 
of the four countries, highlighting the continuing 
potential for tensions within Honiara. Indeed, the 
disaggregated figure for students from Guadalcanal 
was again the highest, with 88 per cent agreeing that 
‘people should stay in the areas of Solomon Islands 
where they grew up’, compared with 65 per cent for 
the rest of the respondent group.
Vanuatu has also had its share of tensions 
arising from rural migration to Port Vila, as uneven 
development and the lure of jobs has resulted in a 
steady stream of rural migrants to the capital city. 
According to one report (Chung and Hill 2002), 
Port Vila has trebled in size since the 1980s, growing 
an average four per cent per year, almost twice as 
fast as the rural population. The increase in the 
urban population living in informal housing or 
settlements has grown even faster. A conflict in one 
such settlement, known as ‘Black Sands’, between 
islanders from Tanna and Ambrym was the centre 
of the conflict that led to the declaration of a state 
of emergency in 2007. An attendant rise in crime 
levels has led to numerous calls for restrictions on 
movements to the capital and even deportation 
of criminals back to their islands (Wirrick 2008). 
Nonetheless, while tertiary students agreed that 
internal migration these were a significant problem 
(88 per cent, with 47 per cent ‘strongly agree’), 
respondents were significantly less likely to agree 
with the second proposition (51 per cent).
While the overall level of support for these two 
statements was considerably lower in Timor-Leste, 
the issue of rural–urban migration has been no less 
contentious there. The population of Timor-Leste’s 
capital Dili has more than doubled in the decade 
since independence, from 100,715 in 1999 (Neupert 
and Lopes 2006) to 241,331 in 2010 (RDTL 
Census 2010), with at least half of this population 
growth due to rural–urban migration. Much of 
this internal migration has been concentrated in 
already overcrowded areas of Dili containing former 
Indonesian civil service and military housing. 
Table 6: Tertiary Students’ Views on Rural–Urban Migration  
(percentage answering ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’)
Papua New 
Guinea
Solomon 
Islands
Vanuatu Timor-Leste
People moving to the cities and 
towns causes social problems
92 88 88 71
People should stay in the area in 
which they grew up
56.5 68 51.5 50.5
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Competition over access to jobs and scarce 
resources such as water and land has led to growing 
tensions and resentment of post-1999 new arrivals. 
This was a key source of the 2006–07 conflict and 
remains so, with concentrated migrant populations 
in the west of the city currently experiencing low-
level conflict. 
Disaggregating the Timor-Leste results by 
region of origin casts light on the nature of these 
continuing tensions. In Timor-Leste, the ‘east’ 
is generally understood to comprise the three 
easternmost districts of Baucau, Viqueque and 
Lautem, and the ‘west’ the ten remaining districts, 
although these notions of east and west are highly 
contested and based more on historical than 
cultural or ethnic differences. After independence, 
conflicts between senior army officers from the 
eastern districts (where the former FALINTIL 
guerrilla resistance proved more sustainable) and 
more junior recruits from the western districts 
were further complicated by tensions between the 
army and the police force, which had a significant 
number of members who had previously served 
in the Indonesian police. When open fighting 
broke out within and between the security forces 
in April 2006, popular resentments associated 
with the urban politics of Dili were also catalysed. 
The Mambae, from the central western highlands, 
are the dominant ethno-linguistic group and 
regard Dili as historically part of their territory. 
Easterners, particularly the Makassae ethno-
linguistic group, are often seen as interlopers in the 
capital, and are frequently referred to as outsiders 
or newcomers, even by newly arrived westerners. 
Throughout the political-military crisis of 2006, 
this viewpoint was used as a justification for the 
eviction of thousands of easterners from their 
homes. In 2010, some four years after the so called 
‘East–West’ crisis, a region of origin breakdown 
of this question found that 35 per cent of students 
from western districts strongly agreed with the 
proposition that ‘people moving to the cities cause 
social problems’, compared with just 27 per cent of 
easterners. On the second question, the difference 
was comparable with 28.5 per cent of westerners 
strongly agreeing that ‘people should stay in the 
area where they grew up’, compared with just 19 per 
cent of easterners. These findings suggest ongoing 
perceptions among some Dili residents from 
western districts that the national capital is located 
in the ‘west’, giving easterners less legitimate claims 
to ownership of potentially contested urban areas.
Preferences for Agents of Dispute Resolution
A further set of questions surveyed student prefer-
ences for agents of dispute resolution in differing 
scenarios. The ongoing importance of both tradi-
tional and modern understandings of political com-
munity was evident in student responses, which 
varied between traditional and modern domains, 
depending on the nature of the conflict. Reflecting 
the customary nature of land tenure in all four coun-
tries, responses to the question ‘who should resolve 
disputes over land?’ revealed that, with the exception 
of Timor-Leste, substantial majorities favoured tra-
ditional authorities and elders (Papua New Guinea 
59 per cent, Solomon Islands 70 per cent, Vanuatu 
71 per cent), with the alternative options (national 
government, local/district/province government, or 
the churches) receiving the balance of preferences. 
In Timor-Leste, the trend was reversed, with just 
28 per cent expressing a preference for traditional 
authorities to settle land disputes, and 58 per cent 
expressing a preference for the national government. 
This finding reflects the complicated overlay of suc-
cessive traditional, Portuguese and Indonesian land 
titles that have been an ongoing source of conflict 
since independence — particularly within Dili — 
and the intractability of a number of long running 
rural land disputes, resulting in part from mass dis-
location during the Indonesian occupation, which 
traditional authorities have failed to resolve. 
In the case of ‘disputes between neighbours’, 
student responses were distinct, with preferences 
for traditional authorities higher than the previous 
question in Timor-Leste (47 per cent), but notably 
lower in Melanesia (Papua New Guinea 40 per cent, 
Solomon Islands 45 per cent, Vanuatu 58 per cent), 
where a preference for national police also emerged 
as significant (Papua New Guinea 45 per cent, Solo-
mon Islands 30 per cent, Vanuatu 28 per cent). In 
Timor-Leste, student preferences for national police 
to be the agents of resolving ‘disputes between neigh-
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bours’ was a mere 11.5 per cent, demonstrating the 
continuing strength of traditional authority, outside 
the particularly contentious issue of land ownership. 
By contrast, the findings indicate that land-related 
disputes remain the key domain of customary law in 
Melanesia. Smaller minorities favoured the church 
as the preferred agent of resolving disputes between 
neighbours, with support highest in Solomon Islands 
(20 per cent), reflecting the positive mediation role 
played by the church there during the crisis period. 
Two further questions sought responses to 
‘crimes against property’ and ‘crimes against the per-
son’, from the options of national police, traditional 
authorities, the church and (in Solomon Islands 
and Timor-Leste only) international police. All four 
countries exhibited strong preferences for national 
police to deal with crimes, which clearly highlight 
student perceptions of the perceived boundaries 
between traditional and modern authority. Of most 
interest were responses relating to the two countries 
with international policing forces. Notably, while 
student preferences for international police were 
comparatively low, they were significantly stronger 
in relation to ‘crimes against the person’ (Solomon 
Islands 19 per cent, Timor-Leste 17 per cent) than 
for ‘crimes against property’ (Solomon Islands 5 per 
cent, Timor-Leste 10 per cent) — findings which 
may be useful in guiding the nature of interna-
tional withdrawal from these missions. While UN 
police have now handed over control to the national 
police in Timor-Leste, this process has most recently 
occurred in Dili, which is seen as the most vola-
tile area. There remain serious concerns over the 
national police force’s ability to control violence in 
the capital city, and east–west divisions still provide 
a source of ongoing tension within the police force 
in Dili (Wilson 2008). Analogous concerns over the 
perceived dominance of police by Malaitans were 
evident in pre-RAMSI Solomon Islands. The 2007 
‘Peoples Survey’ found that as many as 65 per cent of 
people thought that conflict would return if RAMSI 
left (ANU 2010). Overall, these findings clearly sug-
gest the formal idea of ‘crimes’ against individuals 
is firmly associated with the modern state and legal 
system, where more traditional domains are consid-
ered the appropriate means of negotiating collective 
issues that affect and disrupt kinship groups. 
Gender Breakdown: Preferences for Dispute 
Resolution
These findings also revealed significant gender  
differences in preferences for dispute resolution, 
particularly in relation to the role of traditional 
authorities and elders. For example, in Solomon 
Islands, where 73 per cent of male respondents 
indicated a preference for traditional authorities to 
address disputes over land, the equivalent figure for 
female respondents was appreciably lower at 62 per 
cent. Similarly, in Timor-Leste, female students also 
expressed significantly lower preferences for tradi-
tional authorities to resolve land disputes (33 per 
cent male, 21 per cent female), and ‘disputes between 
neighbours’ (52 per cent male, 41 per cent female). 
These findings highlight the way educated female 
students are more likely than male counterparts to 
question the male domination of traditional author-
ity in the villages, and reflect the lack of adequate 
participation and representation in local and tradi-
tional decision-making processes (Wallace 2000).
Conclusion
Nation-building in Melanesia and Timor-Leste 
continues to pose considerable challenges for post-
independence political elites. While this study 
reveals a number of unifying understandings of 
national identity with broad support among likely 
future elites, it also highlights key areas in which 
region of origin, gender, or language of education 
continue to inform divergent and competing visions 
of nation, identity and political community. 
Given the particular educational and social 
profile of the respondent groups in this study, 
it is especially significant that survey responses 
confirmed the strong importance of respecting 
tradition and kastom, and of maintaining local 
identities and languages, in tertiary students’ 
visions of national identity and political com-
munity. The ongoing importance of respecting 
traditional authority and custom was evident in 
all four case study sites, and in each case matched 
indicators of respect for modern state authority, and 
also slightly exceeded perceptions of the importance 
of Christianity to student understandings of 
national identity. 
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Alongside this finding, the high rates of 
responses for the importance of ‘being a citizen’ 
and of ‘respecting political institutions and laws’ 
were notable in their own right, suggesting that the 
modern state and associated civic understandings 
of national identity are equally significant for this 
particular respondent group: a finding which 
defies all-too-common perceptions of Melanesian 
(and increasingly, East Timorese) politics as 
being too focused on parochial clan, language 
or island group concerns. Most importantly, this 
study reveals high degrees of national pride, and 
faith in democratic principles; but conversely, 
low levels of pride in contemporary democratic 
performance and inter-group tolerance. Counter-
intuitively, perhaps, pride in democracy and inter-
group tolerance was higher in recent post-conflict 
societies (Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste) than 
in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. 
Of particular significance was the importance 
of region of origin, island or language of education 
in determining some attitudes to national identity. 
In distinct ways, the four case studies demonstrate 
that the artificial boundaries and legacies created 
by colonial powers, both geographic and linguistic, 
still wield an important influence on contemporary 
attitudes to national identity in these four countries. 
While culture was found to be the key object of 
national pride among respondents, the idea of 
culture nonetheless remains firmly associated with 
local, rather than national, communities, though 
this association was less pronounced in Timor-
Leste than in the Melanesian countries. Gender also 
emerged as an important factor throughout, with 
several findings suggesting strongly that women feel 
a higher level of disaffection with both the formal 
mechanisms of national state power, and traditional 
governance at local level. 
The survey also revealed strong feelings around 
the issue of rural–urban migration. Combined 
with other survey responses such as the findings 
related to pride in ‘the way democracy works’ 
and the ‘fair and equal treatment of all groups in 
society’, such responses constitute both a symptom 
of uneven development, and a marker of regional or 
linguistic faultlines that still pose a challenge to the 
development of a durable sense of ‘national’ political 
community. Competition for scarce resources has 
the effect of sharpening these divisions, as has been 
evident in outbreaks of civil conflict, and ongoing 
tensions in these four countries in recent years. 
This study also supports the view that low  
levels of government capacity are likely to strengthen 
these localised and sub-national identities, as people 
fall back on traditional kinship networks for access 
to resources such as employment, education and 
healthcare — highlighting an ongoing gulf between 
the ideological realm of cultural nationalism, and 
the political/administrative capacities of the state. 
A consequence of reliance on such networks is that 
it places groups in direct competition, enhancing 
the potential for future conflict. Tempering this 
conclusion in part, this study shows that strong 
levels of national identification and pride persist 
among likely future elites, even in the face of 
ongoing regional and linguistic divisions and weak 
state capacity. This suggests a stronger potential 
basis for the continuing processes of nation-building 
if wider challenges of democratic performance, 
service provision and regional development can be 
addressed over time.
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2 Rae (2002), for example, identifies earlier 
incarnations of ‘nation-building’ agendas in forms 
of ‘pathological homogenisation’ aimed at creating 
a unified national population in postcolonial Africa 
and Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. As Berger (2006, 6) 
notes, the terms nation-building and state-building 
have been used, often interchangeably, in, in a 
diversity of situations including ‘formal military 
occupation, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, 
national reconstruction, foreign aid and the use 
of stabilisation forces under the auspices of the 
USA, Britain, France, NATO, the UN or another 
international or regional organization’.
3  In 2004, the percentage of the population under 14 
years of age was estimated at 39 per cent in PNG, 42 
per cent in Solomon Islands, 34 per cent in Vanuatu 
and 38 per cent in Timor-Leste (AusAID 2006).
4 Median age in the Pacific is 21 years, compared, for 
example, with 35.5 years in Australia (SPC 2006). 
5 Hela and Jiwaka are two new provinces that will 
be created in Papua New Guinea in 2012 (from the 
existing Southern and Western Highlands provinces). 
A large liquified natural gas project is being 
constructed in Hela and is leading to conflict over 
land and royalty payments. 
6 Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences’s 
crosstab analysis, Pearson’s chi-squared test established 
significance of the correlation at 0.02 (where 5 per cent 
is a statistically significant correlation). An average 
70 per cent from the three other regions reported 
feeling ‘very close’ to Papua New Guinea, compared 
with 56.5 per cent from the Islands region. Chi-square 
tests indicate the significance of association between 
qualitative variables.
7 These disparities were even larger for reports of 
feeling ‘very close’ to one’s village: Papua New Guinea 
69 per cent men, 57 per cent women; Solomon 
Islands 64 per cent men, 51 per cent women. 
8 In East Timor during the Indonesian occupation, the 
Catholic Church’s decision to use Tetum rather than 
Indonesian in services reinforced the language’s status 
as a lingua franca in parts of East Timor, facilitating 
its emergence as a distinctly “national” language and 
expression of national identity. At the same time, the 
role of the Church as a unifying forum for expressing 
the common suffering of various ethnic and language 
groups in East Timor greatly increased its popularity, 
and to some degree made Catholicism itself a salient 
expression of national identity during the occupation. 
At the same time, as Anderson (1993) notes, the 
Indonesian state requires citizens to affiliate to one of 
the five official religions. Thus, while mistrusting the 
spread of Catholicism in East Timor — particularly 
as the local Church remained staunchly independent 
of the Indonesian Catholic hierarchy — the logic of 
the state also demanded it. In 1975, it is estimated 
that little more than 30 per cent of East Timorese 
identified as Catholic — a figure which had almost 
trebled by 1999. Reflecting these nation-building 
roles, the Catholic Church receives a special mention 
in the new constitution, valorised by the State for its 
‘participation … in the process of national liberation 
of East Timor’ (s11.2) (see Anderson 1993; Leach 2003).
9 Total levels of pride showed a narrower difference in 
relation to pride in democracy (70 per cent v. 65 per 
cent), but remained stark in relation to pride in the 
fair treatment of all groups (79 per cent v. 69 per cent)
10  One female focus group respondent (Port Moresby, 
2009) noted, ‘Although there are some regional 
variations, in my culture, women can’t speak at public 
functions and gatherings’. As the 2006 Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) report on Papua New Guinea states, 
‘Women in PNG do not enjoy equality in relation 
to the ownership, administration, enjoyment and 
disposition of property since land tenure is based on 
custom, leaving men in control of many aspects of 
land and property’ (Jivan and Forster 2007, 282).
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